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Abstract
We extend the non-cooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem introduced in
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) to situations where agents have budget restrictions. We study the Nash
equilibria, subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and strong Nash equilibria of this game.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies cost spanning tree problems (cst). Consider a group of agents, at different geographical
locations. They want a particular service that can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source.
The agents will be served through connections which entail some cost and they are not concerned whether
they are connected directly or indirectly to the source.
The first problem faced in cst problems is how to construct a minimal cost spanning tree (mcst), i.e., a
tree that serves all agents with a minimal total cost. There are several algorithms for solving this problem
(Kruskal (1956), Prim (1957)), but another important issue is how to allocate the cost associated with the
mcst among agents. Claus and Kleitman (1973) introduced this problem, but it was Bird (1976) who first
tackled the issue using game theory. Bird associated a cooperative game with any cst problem and he
∗E-mail address: leticiap@uvigo.es
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proposed a cost allocation rule called Bird’s rule1. Bird’s paper generated further literature on cooperative
game theoretic approaches to cst problems, for instance: Granot and Huberman (1984) studied the nucleolus
of the game proposed by Bird; Feltkamp, Tijs and Muto (2000) studied Bird’s rule; Kar (2002) studied the
Shapley value.
In this cooperative approach, the cost of connecting every agent to the source is minimized and allocated
“fairly” among the agents. But what agents want is to be connected as cheaply as possible; thus given two
different ways of connecting to the source, each agent will prefer the connection that costs him less, regardless
of the total cost. As to fairness, how does a planner convince all agents of the fairness of the final allocation?
A non-cooperative approach will give people more freedom of choice than if forced to connect and pay a
pre-allocated cost.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) describe a real-life problem where agents acted independently in a non-
cooperative way. Some villages in a valley in Ourense (Spain) had insufficient water, so they presented their
problem to the Valley Authority (“Ayuntamiento de Pereiro de Aguiar”) who constructed a dam with pipes
connecting each village to the dam, and a water deposit for each village. These costs were financed by the
Valley Authority and access to this water supply was free, but the cost of constructing pipes to connect the
houses to the supply had to be paid by the villagers. What happened was that the people closest to the water
supply soon decided to connect directly and pay the cost. Among the other people, some of them decided
to connect to the source, whereas others argued that the cost was too high. Once the required pipes were
constructed, most of the remaining unconnected houses decided to connect to the network. At that point,
the cost was not so high since they could indirectly connect through a previously connected house.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) model this situation by means of a non-cooperative game in extensive
form where, at each stage of the game, unconnected agents decide simultaneously whether or not they want
to connect to the source or to some of the agents who are already connected. The game ends when everybody
is connected or all unconnected agents decide simultaneously to remain unconnected. They study the Nash
equilibria (NE) and subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game. They assume, as in all the
literature on cst problems, that agents want to be connected, even if they have to pay the highest connection
cost in the network.
We consider that this assumption may be unrealistic in some situations. In many cases, agents will not
pay some particular cost because they will not be compensated by the utility they obtain when they enjoy
the resource, or because of lack of funds. In fact, in the real-life problem related above, we found both
situations: villagers who did not need additional water and therefore the utility of being connected was null,
1The cooperative game defined by Bird associates with each coalition of agents the minimum cost of connecting all the agents
in the coalition to the source. In Bird’s rule each agent pays the cost of the edge incident upon him on the unique path from
him to the source.
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and villagers who could not afford any connection and waited until the second stage in order to obtain the
water by paying a lower price. In this paper, our aim is to improve the non-cooperative model introduced
in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) by including budget restrictions. We assume that for each agent i there
exists αi ∈ R that can be interpreted in two ways: the utility that agent i obtains when connected to the
source, or the money that agent i has available. As is typical in the literature we assume that the social
planner does not know α = (αi)i∈N but the rest of the agents do. The motivation of this assumption is
that in many cases the agents have more information about the other agents than the information the social
planner has. In our motivating case this seems reasonable. We call these kinds of problems cost spanning
tree problems with budget restrictions.
The literature on the non-cooperative approach to cst problems does not devote much time to studying
what happens when agents are not interested in connecting to the network at any price. In one of the
few works where the issue of budget-restricted agents is addressed, Mutuswami and Winter (2002) analyze
a model of network formation in which the cost of connection is publicly known but in which individual
benefits are not known by the social planner. Mutuswami and Winter (2002) focus on designing a theoretical
mechanism of network formation which provides an efficient, budget-balanced and stable cost allocation, but
they never intend to develop a description of a real problem as our approach does.
In general, introducing budget restricted agents in cst problems is not an easy issue. The situation in
which the budget restriction is public (it is possible to check this objectively) could probably be included in
the cooperative approach. Nevertheless, the most typical and interesting cases arise when budget restrictions
are private. In this case we need to establish each agent’s budget restriction and then process this information.
However, this raises problems of manipulation as agents may lie about their budget if this is profitable for
them. This issue can be studied in the non-cooperative framework, however. The results we obtain show
that the non-cooperative approach works well because agents will always connect to the network paying less
than the money they can afford.
Following Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) we associate a non-cooperative game with each cst problem
with budget restrictions. The non-cooperative game operates in a similar way as in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo
(2004), but there are changes in the utility function that incorporate budget restrictions. This means that
agents have the same strategies in both games, however, since the utility function of both games is different,
strategies that could be “good” for an agent in a game, could become “bad” in the other game. Then, from
a strategic point of view, both games are completely different.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) mainly study the set of SPNE of the game. In this paper we proceed
in a similar way. We characterize the set of payoffs associated with the SPNE using some orders of the
set of agents. Notice that the game defined does not assume any exogenous order of the agents. Given
an order among the agents, let us assume that they connect sequentially according to this order to one of
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the least costly options available, whether a previously connected agent or the source. Thus, the set of
payoffs associated with SPNE coincides with the set of payoffs obtained when agents connect sequentially
according to an order corresponding to a subset of permutations that we call admissible permutations. Thus,
even though the planner does not know the budget restrictions, using the non-cooperative approach he can
guarantee that every agent will be connected paying less than the money he can afford. This is not possible
with the cooperative approach.
In general, the set of SPNE is a subset of the set of NE. Thus, the set of payoffs associated with SPNE
is a subset of the set of payoffs associated with NE. We prove that in our game both set of payoffs coincide.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2005) studied optimal equilibria in the Pareto sense but within the subclass of
cst problems where preferences are strict, i.e., for any agent the cost of connection to two different agents is
different. They characterize undominated SPNE in terms of the strategies played by agents and in terms of
the induced connection tree.
We also address the optimality issue by studying the equilibria that induce a Pareto undominated payoff
in the set of all payoffs induced by strategies where no agent pays more than what he can afford. There
are some SPNE (and hence NE), whose payoffs are Pareto dominated, but the set of Pareto undominated
payoffs associated with SPNE (and hence NE) coincide with the set of payoffs associated with Strong Nash
Equilibria (SNE). This type of result is new and does not appear in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004, 2005).
In general non-cooperative games, when some agents coordinate their actions, they improve their payoff but,
as a consequence of their coordination, the rest of the agents can be worse. In our non-cooperative game, if
agents coordinate their actions, as it may happen in our motivating example, we have Pareto improvements
for all agents (the payoffs of SNE are Pareto optimal).
All the results in this paper are proved assuming that there always exists at least one tree where every
agent can afford his connection. However, we also study what happens if we drop this assumption and
characterize the set of agents that remain unconnected at the end of the game under equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces cst problems; Section 3 describes the associated
non-cooperative game and some relevant results used later on in the paper; Section 4 studies the set of NE
and SPNE and finally, Section 5 addresses the optimality issue and characterizes the set of SNE.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review some definitions and results from minimum cost spanning tree problems that will
ensure a better understanding of this paper.
Let N = {1, . . . , n}. We define N0 := N ∪ {0} in which 0 is the source.
A cost spanning tree problem (cst) studies a situation where a set of agents want to be connected to
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some source, in order to obtain a supply of some resource, either directly or via other agents. Each possible
connection has some non-negative cost associated with it. This can be represented as a pair (N0, C) where N
is the set of agents and C = (cij)i,j∈N0 is a matrix where cij represents the cost of direct connection between
agent i (the source if i = 0) and agent j (the source if j = 0). We assume that cij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N0, cii = 0
for all i ∈ N0 and cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0 (symmetric costs).
Remark 1. Considering symmetric costs is a standard assumption in the literature on cst problems. It is
easy to prove that the results in this paper also hold if we drop this assumption.
We denote by gN0 the set {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N0}. A graph g over N0 is a subset of gN0 with no directed cycles.
Given a graph g a path from i to j is a sequence {(ih, ih+1)}
l−1
h=1 satisfying (ih, ih+1) ∈ g for all h = 1, . . . , l−1,
i1 = i, and il = j.
A tree is a graph that satisfies that, for all i ∈ N , there is a unique path from i to the source. To any
tree g we can associate a cost allocation vector cg = (cgi )i∈N such that c
g
i , the cost associated with agent i,
coincides with cii∗ where i
∗ is the first agent in the unique path from i to the source.
Given a cst problem, we say that g is a Bird’s tree (Bird (1976)) if it is a minimum cost spanning tree,
and we say that x = (xi)i∈N is a Bird’s cost allocation if it is the cost allocation associated with some Bird
tree.
3 The model
A cost spanning tree problem with budget restrictions is a triple (N0, C, α) where (N0, C) is a cst problem
and α = (αi)i∈N . For all i ∈ N , αi ∈ R represents the budget restriction of agent i. Even though we refer to
αi as a budget restriction, we can also interpret it as the utility agent i obtains when he is connected to the
source.
We associate with each cst problem with budget restrictions (N0, C, α) the non-cooperative extensive
form game Γα defined as follows:
Stage 1. Consider M0 = {0}. Agents in N1 = N decide simultaneously whether or not they want to be
connected to the source. Thus, the strategies of agent i ∈ N1 are S1i = M
0 ∪ {a} = {0, a}, where 0 denotes
connecting to the source and a denotes remaining unconnected. Let M1 = {i ∈ N | si = 0} be the set of
agents that connect in this stage and N2 = N1 \M1 the set of agents that remain unconnected. If M1 = ∅
or M1 = N1 the game ends, otherwise we move on to Stage 2.
Let us assume that we have defined Stage r for all r ≤ t. We now define Stage t+ 1.
Stage t+1. Agents in N t+1 decide simultaneously whether or not they want to be connected (to the source
or to some agent who is already connected). Thus, St+1i = ∪
t
r=0M
r ∪ {a}. Let M t+1 = {i ∈ N t+1 | si 6= a}
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and N t+2 = N t+1 \M t+1. If M t+1 = ∅ or M t+1 = N t+1 the game ends, otherwise we move on to Stage
t+ 2.
This game, naturally, terminates in a finite number of stages (n at most) and can be represented as a tree
where the nodes represent the agents and the arcs represent the strategies at each stage of the game.
Assume the game ends at stage t. Let z be a terminal node of the tree representing Γα and N
t+1 the set
of unconnected agents when z is reached. z induces a graph gz = {(i, i∗) | i /∈ N t+1} where i∗ denotes the
agent (or the source) to whom agent i is directly connected, i.e. the first agent in the unique path in gz from
i to the source.
The utility function u is a vector valuated function, where for each i ∈ N :
ui(z) =

 −cii
∗ if ∃i∗ | (i, i∗) ∈ gz
−αi otherwise.
Remark 2. The utility function ui can be redefined in terms of the benefit obtained by the agents in the
following way:
ui(z) =

 αi − cii
∗ if ∃i∗ | (i, i∗) ∈ gz
0 otherwise
for each i ∈ N.
The first definition is related with the interpretation of αi as utility of being connected. This new definition
is related with the interpretation of αi as a budget restriction.
Of course the results obtained in this paper can be adapted easily to this equivalent definition of ui.
Example 1. Consider the cst problem (N0, C) where N = {1, 2}, c01 = c02 = 10, c12 = 5 and α = (8, 20).
The following figure represents the game in extensive form Γα and the utility function associated with each
terminal node of the game:
1
2
a

 −8
−20


a
1
0

 −8
−10


a 
 −10
−10


0 
 −5
−10


2
2
0
2
a

 −10
−20


a 
 −10
−10


0 
 −10
−5


1

 −10
−10


0
Figure 1.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) associate with every cst problem (N0, C) a similar non-cooperative game
in extensive form Γ. The difference between both games is in the utility function of the agents. Bergantin˜os
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and Lorenzo (2004) make the assumption that agents want to be connected, even when they have to pay the
highest cost given by C. They model this concept by forcing any unconnected agent to pay a sufficiently
large cost, α. Thus, the non-cooperative procedure operates the same as in Γα but the utility function u is
given by:
ui(z) =

 −cii
∗ if ∃i∗ | (i, i∗) ∈ gz
−α otherwise
for each i ∈ N,
where α is interpreted as the maximum cost under which connection to the network is profitable for agent i.
The authors assume, as in the literature on cst, that α > cij for all i, j ∈ N0. In this paper we assume that
α depends on i ∈ N . For each agent i we have αi ∈ R, and moreover, we allow αi to be smaller than some
connection cost for agent i (αi < cij for some j ∈ N0 is possible).
Remark 3. We will assume that αi 6= cij for all i ∈ N and every j ∈ N0. This is not a strong restriction:
if αi = cij for an agent i with j ∈ N0 and agent i prefers to connect to j rather than remain unconnected
then we can define a new α′i = αi + ε such that ε > 0 is small enough. Otherwise we can define α
′
i = αi − ε
with a small enough ε > 0.
All the results in the paper are proved under the assumption that there exists a tree g = {(i, i∗)}i∈N such
that cii∗ < αi for all i ∈ N . This means that there exists at least one tree in which every agent is better
off connected rather than unconnected. Later on in the paper we will study what happens if we drop this
assumption.
As in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004), we only work with pure stationary strategies, as this seems to
make more sense in the context of the problem at hand. Stationarity means that decision-making by agents
depends only on who is already connected to the network and not on how agents connected to the network.
Under stationarity the subgames of Γα can be identified with the set X = {R ⊂ N0 | 0 ∈ R}. If we are in
a subgame R ∈ X , this means that in some stage of Γα all agents in R \ {0} are already connected, whether
directly or indirectly, to the source and it is the turn for agents in N0 \R to decide.
The information sets for an agent are the stages in which he is active (i.e., unconnected), so the set of
information sets of an agent i ∈ N is given by Xi = {R ∈ X | i /∈ R}. Thus a strategy si of agent i can be
identified with a map from Xi into {a} ∪N0 \ {i} where si(R) ∈ {a} ∪R for all R ∈ Xi.
Any strategy profile s = (si)i∈N induces a unique terminal node (denoted by z
s) and a unique graph
(denoted by gs). Naturally, we let gs = gz
s
and u(s) = (ui(s))i∈N = u(z
s).
Let ΠN be the set of all permutations over the finite set N . Given pi ∈ ΠN , let Pre(i, pi) = {j ∈ N |
pi(j) < pi(i)} denote the set of elements of N which precede i in the order given by pi.
Given an order of the agents pi, suppose they connect sequentially, following this order, to the preceding
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agent (or the source) with the lowest cost. We say gpi is a tree induced by the permutation pi ∈ ΠN if:
gpi =
{
(i, ipi) | i ∈ N, ipi ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}
and ciipi ≤ cij for all j ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}
}
.
Let us assume that any agent pays his connection cost in accordance with gpi, which means that, for all
i ∈ N, agent i pays ciipi . It is self-evident that if gpi and g′pi are two different trees induced by pi ∈ ΠN
agents pay the same under gpi as under g′pi. Thus it makes sense to define the cost allocation induced by the
permutation pi ∈ ΠN as the vector cpi = cg
pi
= (ciipi )i∈N where g
pi is a tree induced by pi.
Consider the cst problem defined in Example 1 and the order pi(i) = i with i = 1, 2. Suppose the agents
connect sequentially to the preceding agent (or the source) with lowest cost following the order given by
pi. First, agent 1 connects to the source. Then, agent 2 connects to the cheapest option available among
connecting to the source or connecting to agent 1. Thus, agent 2 connects to agent 1. Therefore, the tree
and cost allocation induced by pi are gpi = {(1, 0), (2, 1)} and cpi = (10, 5).
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) characterized the Nash equilibria (NE) and subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria (SPNE) of Γ in terms of the permutations. They proved that x is a payoff associated with a NE (or
SPNE) if and only if there exists a permutation pi such that x = −cpi.
4 Equilibria of the non-cooperative game
In this section we study the set of Nash equilibria (NE) and subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) for
the non-cooperative game Γα when agents have budget restrictions.
In non-cooperative game theory, NE is the most commonly used concept of equilibrium. Moreover, when
studying extensive form games with several stages, SPNE is the most used refinement of NE.
Given α = (αi)i∈N we say that a permutation pi is admissible with respect to α if for every agent i ∈ N
there exists j ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0} such that cij < αi.
Since we assume that there exists a tree g = {(i, i∗)}i∈N such that cii∗ < αi for all i ∈ N , there is at
least one admissible permutation (a permutation satisfying that pi(i∗) < pi(i) for all i ∈ N , where we assume
pi(0) = 0, is admissible). Notice that when we do not have budget restrictions (αi > cij for all j ∈ N0) all
the permutations are admissible.
Given α = (αi)i∈N we denote the set of all admissible permutations with respect to α as Πα.
Given an agent i ∈ N , a strategy s′i of agent i and a strategy profile s, we denote by s \ s
′
i =
(s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn) the strategy profile where agent i uses strategy s
′
i and the rest of the agents act
according to s.
We will characterize the set ofNE and SPNE in terms of the set of admissible permutations Πα. Theorem
1 gives an equivalence between the payoffs and trees associated with the set of SPNE and those associated
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with the set of admissible permutations.
Theorem 1.
{(u(s), gs) | s is an SPNE} = {(−cpi, gpi) | pi ∈ Πα}
Proof . We first prove “⊂”.
Let us assume that s = (si)i∈N is an SPNE and T is the number of the stage in which the game ends
when agents play s. Let M t denote the set of agents that connect in Stage t when agents play s. By the
definition of Γα, M
t ∩M t
′
= ∅ when t 6= t′.
Suppose that ∪Tt=1M
t 6= N . Since we have assumed that there always exists a tree where every agent can
pay its connection, we can find an admissible permutation pi′. Consider the first unconnected agent according
to the order given by pi′, i.e., i ∈ N \
(
∪Tt=1M
t
)
such that Pre(i, pi′) ⊂ ∪Tt=1M
t. Note that such a choice for
agent i always exists because we have supposed that ∪Tt=1M
t 6= N . Since i ∈ N \
(
∪Tt=1M
t
)
we have that
ui(s) = −αi.
Since pi′ is admissible, there exists j ∈ Pre(i, pi′) ∪ {0} such that cij < αi and j ∈ M t
′
with t′ ≤ T . Let
s′i be a strategy of agent i defined by:
s′i (R) =
{
j when R = ∪t
′
t=1M
t
a otherwise
where agent i waits until agent j connects and immediately connects to agent j in the next stage. Thus,
ui(s \ s′i) = −cij > −αi, which is a contradiction because s is an SPNE. So, N = ∪
T
t=1M
t, which means
that in any SPNE of Γα, every agent is connected.
Therefore, gs can be written as gs = {(i, i∗) | i ∈ N} and ui(s) = −cii∗ for all i ∈ N .
We now prove that cii∗ < αi for all i ∈ N . Assume there exists i ∈ N such that cii∗ > αi. Consider the
strategy s′′i of agent i satisfying s
′′
i (R) = a for every information set R. Thus, ui(s \ s
′′
i ) = −αi > −cii∗ ,
which is a contradiction because s is an SPNE.
We associate with s a permutation pi ∈ ΠN defined as follows: firstly, the agents of M1 appear arranged
in any order; secondly, the agents of M2 appear arranged in any order. The process continues until MT .
Formally, pi satisfies the following condition: if i ∈ M t, j ∈ M t
′
and t < t′ then pi(i) < pi(j). Notice that it
is possible for several permutations to satisfy this condition.
We assume, without any loss of generality, that pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N . We now prove that gs is
a tree induced by pi, i.e., for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}, cii∗ ≤ cij . Let i be an agent in M t,
j ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}, and j 6= i∗. By the definition of pi, j ∈M t
′
with t′ ≤ t (if j = 0, t′ = 0 and M0 = {0}).
Let s′i be such that s
′
i(M
0) = s′i(M
0 ∪M1) = . . . = s′i
(
∪t
′−1
q=0 M
q
)
= a, s′i
(
∪t
′
q=0M
q
)
= j when t′ < t, and
s′i
(
∪t−1q=0M
q ∪ (M t \ {i})
)
= j when t′ = t. Since s is an SPNE we have −cij = ui(s \ s′i) ≤ ui(s) = −cii∗ .
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By our definition of cpi we know that cpii = cii∗ for all i ∈ N . It is now easy to conclude that u(s) = −c
pi
and pi ∈ Πα.
We now prove “⊃”.
Consider pi ∈ Πα and a tree g
pi induced by pi. We assume, without loss of generality, that pi(i) = i for all
i ∈ N . Recall that if gpi is induced by pi then:
gpi = {(i, ipi) | i ∈ N , ipi < i, and ciipi ≤ cij for all j < i} .
Given i ∈ N we define the strategy si as follows. For each R ∈ Xi, we select an agent iR ∈ argminj∈R{cij}
such that iR coincides with ipi when ipi ∈ argminj∈R{cij}:
si(R) =
{
iR if Pre(i, pi) ⊂ R
a otherwise.
Under si agent i connects if and only if all the agents who precede him in permutation pi are already
connected. In this case he connects to the connected agent with the lowest cost. Moreover, ciiR < αi for all
i ∈ N because pi is an admissible permutation.
Let us assume that any agent i plays si. In Stage 1 agent 1 connects to the source and the remaining agents
remain unconnected. In Stage 2 agent 2 connects to agent 2pi and agents of N \{1, 2} remain unconnected. If
we repeat this argument the game continues until Stage n and for any Stage t (t = 1, . . . , n) agent t connects
to agent tpi and agents of N \ (Pre(t, pi) ∪ {t}) remain unconnected.
Now it is easy to conclude that gpi = gs and ui(s) = −ciipi = −cpii for all i ∈ N .
We now prove that s is an SPNE. We first prove that s is a NE. Thus, we only need to consider
deviations from agent’s i strategy at the information sets that are reached when s is played. Note that these
information sets are {Pre(k, pi) ∪ {0}}k∈N because agents connect sequentially following the order pi.
Let s′i be a strategy of agent i different from si. We proceed by induction.
Let us assume that s′i(0) 6= si(0). We distinguish two cases:
1. i = 1: in this case si(0) = 0. Thus, s
′
i(0) = a and hence, ui(s \ s
′
i) = −αi < −ci0 = −ciipi = ui(s)
because pi is admissible.
2. i > 1: in this case si(0) = a. Thus, s
′
i(0) = 0 and hence, ui(s \ s
′
i) = −ci0 ≤ ui(s) because ui(s) =
−ciipi ≥ −cij for all j ∈ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}.
We now prove that if s′i (Pre(k, pi) ∪ {0}) = si (Pre(k, pi) ∪ {0}) and s
′
i(Pre(k+1, pi)∪{0}) 6= si(Pre(k+
1, pi) ∪ {0}) then, ui(s \ s′i) ≤ ui(s). We distinguish several cases:
1. i > k + 1: agent i deviates in Stage k + 1 < i, which means that agent i connects before it is
his turn to connect. Since si (Pre(k + 1, pi) ∪ {0}) = a we have that s′i (Pre(k + 1, pi) ∪ {0}) = j ∈
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Pre(k + 1, pi) ∪ {0} ⊂ Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}. Therefore, ui(s \ s′i) = −cij ≤ −ciipi = ui(s) because i
pi ∈
argminj∈Pre(i,pi)∪{0}{cij}.
2. i = k + 1: agent i deviates in Stage i. Since si(Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}) = ipi two cases are possible:
• Agent i connects to a different option: s′i (Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}) = j ∈ (Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}) \ {i
pi}. Again
ui(s \ s′i) = −cij ≤ −ciipi = ui(s) because i
pi ∈ argminj∈Pre(i,pi)∪{0}{cij}.
• Agent i decides not to connect: s′i (Pre(i, pi) ∪ {0}) = a. Then, ui(s \ s
′
i) = −αi < −ciipi = ui(s)
because pi is admissible.
3. i < k+1: agent i does not deviate in the first i stages. By definition of s we conclude that ui(s \ s′i) =
ui(s).
Thus s is a NE.
It only remains for us to prove that s induces a NE in any subgame of Γα different from the whole
game. Every subgame of Γα is identified by the set of agents already connected because of stationarity.
Let R ∈ X be a subgame of Γα. We denote by piN\R the order induced by pi on N \ R. We assume that
piN\R = {i1, . . . , in−r} and that the subgame R corresponds to Stage t.
If we apply s to subgame R we obtain the following. In Stage t agent i1 connects to i
R
1 whereas agents in
{i2, . . . , in−r} choose a. Then, the game proceeds to Stage t+1. In this stage i2 connects to i
R∪{i1}
2 whereas
agents in {i3, . . . , in−r} choose a. The procedure continues in this way until agent in−r connects to i
N\{in−r}
n−r .
Next we prove that s induces aNE in the subgame starting at information setR. Given ik ∈ {i1, . . . , in−r},
assume s′ik(R) 6= sik(R). We need to consider two cases:
1. k = 1: in this case si1(R) = i
R
1 . We consider two cases: s
′
i1
(R) = a or s′i1(R) = j 6= i
R
1 . In the first case
ui1(s \ s
′
i1
) = −αi1 ≤ −ci1iR1 because pi is admissible. In the second case ui1(s \ s
′
i1
) = −ci1j ≤ −ci1iR1 =
ui1(s) because of the definition of i
R
1 .
2. k > 1: in this case sik(R) = a. Thus, s
′
ik
(R) = j ∈ R and uik(s \ s
′
ik
) = −cikj ≤ −ciki
R∪{i1,...,ik−1}
k
=
uik(s) because of the definition of i
R∪{i1,...,ik−1}
k .
Assume s′ik(R) = sik(R), s
′
ik
(R ∪ {i1, . . . , ip}) = sik(R ∪ {i1, . . . , ip}) for all 1 < p < q, and s
′
ik
(R ∪
{i1, . . . , iq}) 6= sik(R ∪ {i1, . . . , iq}). We prove that uik(s \ s
′
ik
) ≤ uik(s). We distinguish three cases:
1. q < k − 1: in this case agent ik connects earlier, so s′ik(R ∪ {i1, . . . , iq}) = j ∈ R ∪ {i1, . . . , iq}, and
uik(s \ s
′
ik
) = −cikj ≤ −ciki
R∪{i1,...,ik−1}
k
= uik(s) because R ∪ {i1, . . . , iq} ⊂ R ∪ {i1, . . . , ik−1}.
2. q = k − 1: in this case agent ik changes his strategy when it is his turn to connect. Two cases are
possible:
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• Not to connect, that is s′ik(R∪{i1, . . . , ik−1}) = a. Then, uik(s\s
′
ik
) = −αik ≤ −ciki
R∪{i1,...,ik−1}
k
=
uik(s) because pi is admissible.
• Connect to a different option, that is s′ik(R∪{i1, . . . , iq}) = j ∈ (R∪{i1, . . . , ik−1})\{i
R∪{i1,...,ik−1}
k }.
Then, by definition of iR∪{i1,...,ik−1}, uik(s \ s
′
ik
) = −cikj ≤ uik(s).
3. q > k − 1: in this case agent ik deviates from his strategy after his turn. It is easy to see that
uik(s \ s
′
ik
) = uik(s).
We can conclude that s induces a NE in an arbitrary subgame R. Thus, s is an SPNE.
This finishes the proof. QED
The next corollary states a similar result for NE.
Corollary 1.
{(u(s), gs) | s is a NE} = {(−cpi, gpi) | pi ∈ Πα}
Proof. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1, we have that {(u(s), gs) |
s is a NE} ⊂ {(−cpi, gpi) | pi ∈ Πα}. Moreover, since every SPNE is a NE the proof is complete. QED
The idea underlying these results is quite standard in the literature. It is commonly known as a “greedy
procedure” in combinatorial optimization and computer science. Assuming that we must assign something
to a group of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, we proceed as follows. First, we order the agents; for instance 1, . . . , n.
Next we assign to agent 1 the “best available” when this agent acts alone. Then, we assign to agent 2
the best available when only agent 1 and 2 are present and agent 1 has what he had obtained before. We
proceed with agents 3, . . . , n in a similar fashion. If we apply this procedure to a TU game2 we obtain, for
each permutation, a vector of marginal contributions, which was used by Shapley (1953) to define his value.
Moulin (2002) describes applications to other problems.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that when agents act independently, under equilibria, they will all end
up connected, each paying an amount within their budget restriction. This model is useful when the planner
in charge of solving the cst allocation problem cannot or does not want to force agents to pay something.
This aspect is very important when there are budget restrictions, as in our motivating example. With budget
restrictions it does not seem like a good idea to force agents to pay a fixed amount to connect to the source.
Since the planner does not know α, it could happen that this amount is larger than αi for some agent i. Thus,
the planner may force some agent to connect, even when he prefers to remain unconnected. Nevertheless,
using the non-cooperative approach we can guarantee that every agent will be connected paying less than
2A game with transferable utility, also known as a TU game, is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents and
v : 2N → R is the characteristic function that satisfies v (∅) = 0.
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the money they can afford. The main disadvantage of the non-cooperative approach is inefficiency, i.e. the
tree constructed may not be a minimum cost spanning tree.
Example 2. Consider the following cst problem where the budget restrictions are given by α = (16, 11, 31).
2
1 3
0
15 5
10 2530
20
In the following table we compute the trees and payoffs associated with NE and SPNE via the admissible
permutations:
pi gpi −cpi
132 0← 1← 3← 2 (−10,−5,−20)
312 1→ 0← 3← 2 (−10,−5,−25)
321 1→ 0← 3← 2 (−10,−5,−25)
Table 1.
This example enables us to make the following comments: two different permutations (312 and 321)
can generate the same tree and payoff. In addition, Bird’s cost allocation (−10,−15,−5), associated with
permutation 123, is not admissible. Thus, it cannot be obtained as a NE of Γα. When there are no budget
restrictions, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004) proved that Bird’s cost allocation can be always obtained through
an SPNE of Γα.
Note that the set of NE and SPNE could be different. Let us define s = (s1, s2, s3) as:
s1({0}) = a, s1({0, 2}) = 0, s1({0, 3}) = 0, s1({0, 2, 3}) = a,
s2({0}) = a, s2({0, 1}) = a, s2({0, 3}) = 3, s2({0, 1, 3}) = 3,
s3({0}) = 0, s3({0, 1}) = 1, s3({0, 2}) = 2, s3({0, 1, 2}) = 2.
s is a NE and its associated payoff is (−10,−5,−25) which is the same as the one induced by permutation
312. However, s is not an SPNE. If we consider the subgame R = {0, 2, 3}, agent 1 plays a, but playing 0
he will improve his payoff.
It is possible for some cost allocations associated with admissible permutations to be dominated in the
Pareto sense. In this example, (−10,−5,−25) is Pareto dominated by (−10,−5,−20).
Another interesting aspect of these results is that, the fact of having budget-restricted agents significantly
reduces the number of equilibria. Also, these results provide us with a genuinely simple algorithm for
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computing all the payoffs associated with SPNE. Note that in general it is quite difficult to compute the
SPNE and NE of an arbitrary game, as can be seen in the works by Chen and Deng (2005a, 2005b) and
Daskalakis et al. (2006), where the computational complexity of computing a NE is studied. Bergantin˜os and
Lorenzo (2005) detail an algorithm to obtain all the trees and payoffs associated with SPNE and hence with
NE when there are no budget restrictions. This algorithm can be easily adapted to this general framework
in the following way:
Given a permutation pi ∈ ΠN , let R0 = {0} and adm0 = Y ES:
• We define Rpi(1) = {0, pi(1)}, pi∗(1) = 0, and admpi(1) =

 NO if cpi∗(1)pi(1) > αpi(1)Y ES otherwise.
• Assume we have defined Rpi(j), pi∗(j), and admpi(j) for all j < i. Next, we define:
– Rpi(i) = Rpi(i−1) ∪ {pi(i)},
– pi∗(i) = arg min
j∈Rpi(i−1)
cjpi(i), and
– admpi(i) =

 NO if adm
pi(i−1) = NO or cpi∗(i)pi(i) > αpi(i)
Y ES otherwise.
Note that Πα = {pi ∈ ΠN | admpi(n) = Y ES}. By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, the set of payoffs and trees
associated with NE and SPNE is {(−cpi, gpi) | pi ∈ Πα}.
In this paper it is assumed that there exists at least one connection tree where each agent pays less than his
budget restriction. Taking into account this assumption, under equilibrium, every agent ends up connected
to the source paying less than what they can afford. But, what happens if we drop this assumption?.
Let us recursively define the following sets: let R0 = {0}, and
Rk =
{
i ∈ N0 \ (∪
k−1
q=0R
q) | min
j∈Rk−1
cij < αi
}
.
We stop when we find t such that Rt 6= ∅ but Rt+1 = ∅. The intuition behind these family of sets is that each
set involves those agents that can afford at least one of the connection costs to one of the agents belonging
to the previous set. Let N∗ = ∪tq=1R
q.
The following proposition shows that, under equilibrium, the agents that end up connected to the network
are always the same.
Proposition 1. Let s = (si)i∈N be a NE of the non-cooperative game Γα associated with (N0, C, α). Then,
∪Tt=1M
t = N∗, where M t denotes the set of agents that connect in stage t when agents play s, and T is the
stage in which the game Γα ends when agents play s.
Proof. We first prove “⊂”.
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Consider the tree gs = {(i, i∗) | i ∈ ∪Tt=1M
t} induced by s. Assume that (∪Tt=1M
t)\N∗ 6= ∅. We can find
an agent i ∈ (∪Tt=1M
t)\N∗ such that ti, the stage in which agent i is connected, satisfies ti = min
j∈(∪Tt=1M
t)\N∗
tj ,
i.e., agent i is the first agent that connects who is not in N∗.
Consider the following strategy for agent i: s′i(R) = a for all R ∈ Xi. We distinguish two cases:
1. ti = 1. Then ui(s) = −c0i. Since i /∈ N
∗, we know that cij > αi for all j ∈ N
∗ ∪ {0}. Thus,
ui(s) = −c0i < −αi = ui(s \ s′i), which is a contradiction because s is a NE.
2. ti > 1. Since ti = min
j∈(∪Tt=1M
t)\N∗
tj , we know that ∪
ti−1
t=1 M
t ⊂ N∗. Therefore, cij > αi for all
j ∈ ∪ti−1t=1 M
t ∪ {0}. Thus, ui(s) = −cii∗ < −αi = ui(s \ s′i), which is a contradiction because s is
a NE.
Hence ∪Tt=1M
t ⊂ N∗.
We now prove “⊃”.
Assume that N∗\(∪Tt=1M
t) 6= ∅. We can find i ∈ N∗\(∪Tt=1M
t) such that i ∈ Rk and ∪k−1q=1R
q ⊂ ∪Tt=1M
t.
By definition of Rk, there exists j ∈ Rk−1 ⊂ ∪Tt=1M
t such that cij < αi. Let us define the following strategy
for agent i:
s′i(R) =

 j when R = ∪
T
t=1M
t ∪ {0}
a otherwise.
Therefore, ui(s) = −αi < −cij = ui(s \ s′i), which is a contradiction because s is a NE. Thus, N
∗ ⊂
∪Tt=1M
t and hence ∪Tt=1M
t = N∗. QED
This result shows that, under NE (hence SPNE), we only need to care about the agents in N∗, since
they are the only ones that will end up connected to the source. Note that to connect agents in N\N∗ to the
source is inefficient in the Pareto sense. Thus, the results in Theorem 1, and therefore Corollary 1, can be
exported to a more general framework by focusing our study on the set of admissible permutations restricted
to N∗.
Example 3. Consider the cst defined in Example 2 but with budget restrictions given by α = (9, 11, 31).
Note that in this case agent 1 cannot afford any connection cost in the network, agent 2 can only afford
the cost of the connection to agent 3, and agent 3 can afford every connection cost in the network. In this
case N∗ = {2, 3} and there is only one admissible permutation over N∗: the order 32. Thus, the payoff and
connection tree associated with any NE or SPNE s will be u(s) = (−9,−5,−25) and gs = {(3, 0), (2, 3)}.
5 Pareto optimal equilibria
Example 2 shows that in some cases the payoffs associated with some SPNE orNE can be Pareto dominated.
In this section we study the set of Pareto undominated equilibria. Even though we only describe the results
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for NE, it is evident that they also hold for SPNE.
We formally define some concepts used in this section.
Given x = (xi)i∈N and y = (yi)i∈N we say that x Pareto dominates y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and xj > yj
for at least one j ∈ N .
We say that a strategy profile s is Pareto optimal if there is no strategy profile s′ such that u(s′) Pareto
dominates u(s). Usually, we say s′ Pareto dominates s instead of u(s′) Pareto dominates u(s).
We say that a strategy profile s is admissible if ui(s) ≥ −αi for all i ∈ N . A payoff is admissible if it is a
payoff associated with an admissible strategy profile. Moreover, we say that a tree g is admissible if cgi ≤ αi
for all i ∈ N .
Remark 4. Notice that in the definition of an admissible tree cgi ≤ αi is equivalent to c
g
i < αi because in a
tree every agent is connected and we have assumed that αi 6= cij for all i ∈ N and every j ∈ N0.
We say that s = (si)i∈N is a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if no coalition has an incentive to deviate,
i.e., for every R ⊂ N and (s′i)i∈R, (ui((sj)j∈N\R, (s
′
j)j∈R))i∈R does not Pareto dominate (ui(s))i∈R.
Remark 5. We can define the subgame strong Nash equilibria in the obvious way (no coalition has an
incentive to deviate in any subgame). It is easy to check that the results obtained for SNE are also true for
subgame strong Nash equilibria.
Our first result on Pareto optimality is that the set of payoffs associated with Pareto undominated NE
are Pareto undominated in the set of all admissible payoffs. Subsequently we will prove that the set of
payoffs associated with Pareto undominated NE coincides with the set of payoffs associated with strong
Nash equilibria SNE. The consequence of both results is that the set of payoffs associated with SNE
coincides with the set of Pareto undominated admissible payoffs. (Notice that we are looking for Pareto
optimal NE in the set of all admissible payoffs, not only in the set of payoffs associated with NE).
The next proposition is a preliminary result that will be used below.
Proposition 2. If g is an admissible tree that is not induced by any admissible permutation, then we can
find pi ∈ Πα such that −cpi Pareto dominates −cg.
Proof. Let g be an admissible tree that is not induced by any permutation. We define the following sets:
R1 = {i ∈ N | (i, 0) ∈ g}. R1 6= ∅ because g is a tree.
Let us assume that we have defined Rq for all q ≤ t. We define:
Rt+1 =
{
i ∈ N \
(
∪tq=1Rq
)
| (i, j) ∈ g for some j ∈ Rt
}
. If N \
(
∪tq=1Rq
)
6= ∅ then Rt+1 6= ∅ because g
is a tree.
Since N is finite there exists T such that RT 6= ∅ and RT+1 = ∅. Then {Rt}Tt=1 is a partition of N .
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Let pi ∈ ΠN be a permutation satisfying the following condition: if i ∈ Rt1 , j ∈ Rt2 and t1 < t2 then
pi(i) < pi(j). We assume without loss of generality that pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N .
Since g is not induced by pi we can find j, j∗ ∈ N such that j∗ < j, (j, j∗) ∈ g and cjj∗ > min
l<j
cjl = c
pi
j .
Consider some i ∈ Rt ⊂ N . There exists i∗ ∈ Rt−1 (if i ∈ R1, i∗ = 0) such that (i, i∗) ∈ g and c
g
i = cii∗ . By
definition of pi, i∗ < i and, hence, cgi ≥ min
l<i
cil = c
pi
i . Therefore, −c
pi Pareto dominates −cg, and since g is
admissible, pi ∈ Πα. QED
Theorem 2. Given an admissible strategy profile s, let us assume that there is no NE s′ satisfying u(s) =
u(s′). Then, s is Pareto dominated by a NE s∗.
Proof. Take s = (si)i∈N such that u(s) 6= u(s′) for all NE s′. Assume that, in accordance with s, the game
ends at stage T .
We distinguish two cases:
1. NT+1 6= ∅. Since the game ends at stage T , NT+1 denotes the set of agents that are not connected at
the end of the game. Let pi be an admissible permutation. For each i ∈ NT+1 consider the strategy s′′i
defined in the following way:
s′′i (R) =
{
iR if (N \NT+1) ∪ Pre(i, pi) ⊂ R
a otherwise,
such that iR ∈ argminj∈R{cij}.
We define s′′ =
(
(si)i∈N\NT+1 , (s
′′
i )i∈NT+1
)
. Under s′′i agent i ∈ N
T+1 connects if and only if each
agent who precedes him in permutation pi and all the agents in N \NT+1 are already connected, and
in this case he connects to the least costly option available.
Notice that for an agent i ∈ N\NT+1, ui(s) = ui(s′′). On the other hand, for an agent i ∈ NT+1,
ui(s
′′) > −αi = ui(s) because pi is admissible. Hence, s is Pareto dominated by s′′.
If there is a NE s∗ such that u(s∗) = u(s′′) then the result holds.
Otherwise, since each agent is connected in s′′ to an admissible option, we know that gs
′′
is an admissible
tree and −c(g
s′′) = u(s′′). By Corollary 1, gs
′′
is not induced by an admissible permutation. By
Proposition 2, there exists an admissible permutation pi′ such that −cpi
′
Pareto dominates −c(g
s′′). By
Corollary 1, we can find a NE s∗ such that u(s∗) = −cpi
′
. Thus, s∗ dominates s′′. Since s′′ dominates
s we conclude that s∗ is a NE that Pareto dominates s.
2. NT+1 = ∅. Therefore, all agents are connected and hence gs is an admissible tree. Using arguments
similar to those used above with gs
′′
we can find a NE s∗ that Pareto dominates s.
QED
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This theorem states that if the payoff associated with an admissible strategy does not coincide with the
payoff associated with a NE, it is Pareto dominated by a NE payoff. This result leads us to conclude that the
set of payoffs associated with Pareto undominated NE are Pareto undominated in the set of all admissible
payoffs, but not in the set of all possible payoffs. In Example 1, Bird’s cost allocation cannot be obtained
as a payoff associated with a NE but is always undominated. Those undominated payoffs that cannot be
obtained as a NE are not admissible and so do not arise from rational behavior.
We will now prove that the set of payoffs associated with SNE coincides with the set of payoffs associated
with Pareto optimal NE.
Theorem 3. Given a Pareto optimal NE s, there exists an SNE s∗ such that u(s∗) = u(s).
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction. Let s0 be a Pareto optimal NE such that there is no SNE
s∗ satisfying u(s0) = u(s∗).
Since s0 is a NE, by Theorem 1, there exists an admissible permutation pi such that u(s0) = −cpi and
gs
0
= gpi. Without loss of generality, we assume that pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N .
Given pi we define the strategy si as in the proof of Theorem 1. For each R ∈ Xi, we select an agent
iR ∈ argminj∈R{cij} such that iR coincides with ipi when ipi ∈ argminj∈R{cij}. Now,
si(R) =
{
iR if Pre(i, pi) ⊂ R
a otherwise.
By Theorem 1 we know that s is a NE satisfying that u(s) = −cpi = u(s0). Since s0 is Pareto optimal and
u(s) = u(s0), s is also Pareto optimal.
Since there is no SNE s∗ such that u(s) = u(s∗), s is not an SNE. Thus, there exists Q ⊂ N and (s′i)i∈Q
such that (ui(s
′))i∈Q Pareto dominates (ui(s))i∈Q where s
′ = ((si)i∈N\Q, (s
′
i)i∈Q).
Let us prove that s′ Pareto dominates s. Since (ui(s
′))i∈Q Pareto dominates (ui(s))i∈Q it is enough to
prove that ui(s
′) ≥ ui(s) for all i ∈ N \Q.
Suppose that some agents of N \Q are not connected when s′ is played. Let i be the first unconnected
agent of N \Q in the order given by pi. By definition of si this means that there exists j ∈ Pre(i, pi) who is
not connected. Since i is the first agent in N \Q according to pi, j ∈ Q. Thus, uj(s′) = −αj < −cjjpi = uj(s),
which is false because (ui(s
′))i∈Q Pareto dominates (ui(s))i∈Q. Therefore all agents of N \Q are connected
when s′ is played. Because of the definition of s, an agent i in N \Q connects when all the agents in Pre(i, pi)
are already connected, hence ui(s
′) = −ciiR ≥ −ciipi = ui(s) for some R ⊃ Pre(i, pi) and for all i ∈ N \Q.
Thus s′ Pareto dominates s, but if s′ is a NE or there exists a NE s′′ such that u(s′′) = u(s′) we get
a contradiction because s is a Pareto optimal NE. Otherwise, by Theorem 2, we can find a NE s′′ which
Pareto dominates s′ and hence s. Again we get a contradiction because s is a Pareto optimal NE. QED
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The converse of this theorem is also true since for any non-cooperative game, SNE, when they exist,
are Pareto optimal. The next corollary is therefore a self-evident consequence of the previous results and we
omit the proof.
Corollary 2.
{(u(s), gs) | s is a Pareto optimal NE} = {(u(s), gs) | s is an SNE}
In an arbitrary non-cooperative game, SNE may not exist. But in Γα, SNE always exist and coincide
with the set of Pareto optimal SPNE.
The set of SNE has not been studied before in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004, 2005). We explain the
practical implications of this result. In general non-cooperative games, when some agents coordinate their
actions, these agents can improve their payoffs. Unfortunately, the rest of the agents can be worse off. In our
non-cooperative game, if agents coordinate their actions this is good because we have Pareto improvements of
all agents since the payoffs of SNE are Pareto optimal. This is an interesting fact because in our motivating
example villagers can talk and coordinate their actions.
Remark 6. Notice that when we do not have budget restrictions (αi > cij for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N0\{i}), the
set of payoff vectors and trees associated with NE coincide with those associated with the set of permutations.
It follows that when a strategy profile is not an NE, it is not Pareto optimal, and thus we can conclude that
Pareto undominated NE are Pareto undominated in the set of all possible payoffs.
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